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EQUITY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES
W Hamilton Bryson

Q.UITY is the system ofjustice that arose in the
court of the lord chancellor of England in
the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century. (In
order to avoid confusion, this essay will not use
the word equity to refer to the nontechnical concepts of fairness and justice.) Equitable remedies
are those remedies granted by courts of equity as
opposed to legal remedies, which are granted by
courts of common law. The system of remedies
we call equity arose to supplement and to complement, but not to supplant, the common law of
England.

E

ENGLISH ANTECEDENTS TO
MODERN EQUITY PRACTICE
The common law of England in the Middle
Ages, whether administered in the royal courts
or the county courts, was an unwritten system of
law that was thought to be totally comprehensive; it governed all situations, and it was the
duty of the courts to "discover" the law and to
apply it to each particular case. In the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, common-law remedies
grew to combat all types of injuries; in some
cases the royal courts were granting remedies to
deal with problems formerly handled only in the
county courts and, in other cases, to deal with
newly invented injuries. This was a period of
luxuriant growth for the English common law.
However, the fourteenth century saw the rise of
Parliament as a legislative body and, by midcentury, the development of a substantial body of
judicial precedent stating the common law. The
result was that common-law judges were becoming trapped by their own precedents and in time
became unable to change the law without trespassing upon the legislative prerogative of Par-

liament. Judicial restraint is a good thing, but it
can be carried too far, for there is no such thing
as a general rule (or a statute) that cannot be
avoided or perverted by persons of bad intentions. Furthermore, the medieval Parliament was
not a very efficient legislature by modem standards; for one thing it met only irregularly, usually being called when the king needed more
money.
As the common-law courts became unable to
grant new types of remedies to deal with new
types of problems, litigants turned to the king,
and the king sent them to the lord chancellor, the
head of the royal secretariat, for special aid. As
these special petitions were regularly accepted
and decided, the chancery developed into !: law
court, and the system of justice administered
there became known as equity. Equity thus arose
several centuries later than the common law and
was that much more modern in terms of procedure and substantive law. It is to be remembered
that chancery is a court that applies the system of
law called equity. A chancellor is an official who
is the keeper of someone's seal; the lord chancellor of Great Britain is only incidentally a judge.
Thus, an equity judge is not usually a chancellor,
though in the United States the term chancellqr is
sometimes used to refer ·to an equity judge ~nd
the term chancery is used loosely to refer to an
equity court and equity jurisdiction. '"fhis article
will use the word chancery to refer only to the
court of the lord chancellor and not to any other
court of equity.
Equity arose in the court of chancery in order
to provide remedies when the common law
proved inadequate to do justice in a particular
case. (From the middle of the sixteenth century
onward, the court of exchequer also granted equitable remedies.) Some of the substantive im-
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provements of equity were the enforcement of
trusts and the use of various defenses to contracts. A trust, or a use, was a type of contract,
usually in reference to land, which was invented
after the common-law writs (which controlled
the jurisdiction and procedures of the commonlaw courts) had become fixed and unchangeable.
A trust is the situation in which the common-law
ownership of property is given to a person (the
trustee) to hold and manage for the benefit of
another person (the beneficiary of the trust).
Since there was no common-law writ available to
1
enfo rce a trust and since the chancery clerks and
the common-law judges could not change the
law by inventing a new one without unconstitutionally usurping the legislative power of Parliament, the chancellor enforced them. It was clear
to the entire legal profession that justice required the enforcement of trusts and uses. Since
the common-law courts could (or would) not,
everyone agreed that equity should. Thus, the
beneficiary of the trust is said to be the equitable
owner of the property in question. The trust,
which is completely unknown in European law, is
a maknificent device for managing property or
companies in both personal and commercial settings. This device has been steadily refined over
the centuries to serve more and more needs of
society.
In the area of contracts, justice required that
each party receive "consideration"-that is,
something of value for the performance of his
part of the agreement. The common-law courts
required proof of consideration "flowing" from
the plaintiff to the defendant (the obligor) before
a plaintiff (the obligee) could recover on an oral
contract. However, if the contract was in writing
and under the defendant's seal, the written and
sealed instrument was sufficient proof for a common-law recovery, even though there was no
consideration. A sharp dealer would be able to
take advantage of others by always having such
an unfair bargain reduced to writing with an eye
to future litigation, relying on well-established
common-law precedent. The common-law
courts could not change their law, but the court
of equity came to require the unconscionable
obligee to forgo his unfair gain. The courts of
equity required that all contracts be supported
by consideration on both sides.
The mortgage is a common-law conveyance of

land to secure a loan; the mortgage contract is
written so that if the loan is repaid, the debtor
gets his land back; if it is not repaid in full, the
creditor keeps the land, even if only one payment
is not made or if payment is made only one day
late. In many cases a debtor may be in technical
default only, but the common-law courts must
enforce the contract that was freely entered into
by the debtor. To prevent such harsh results,
penalties, and forfeitures, the courts of equity
allow the debtor to redeem his land by making
the payments late (with appropriate additional
interest); thus, the equity courts have created
what is called an equity ofredemption. (To protect fair-minded creditors, the courts of equity
allow a creditor to come into the equity court and
prove the hopeless insolvency of his debtor, and
the equity judge will foreclose the debtor's equity of redemption; this will give the creditor
clear title to the land being held as security so
that he can sell it and recoup the amount of the
defaulted loan.) Although the general commonlaw rule that contracts should be kept is well
respected by society, ever'yone's sense of justice
will acknowledge that the equity of redemption
is a fine tuning by the courts of equity that results
in substantial justice in the individual case where
the debtor is acting in good faith but has had a
bit of bad luck.
In more recent times the courts of equity have
evolved a law of fiduciary responsibility, which
did not exist in medieval England. Thus, administrators of estates, guardians of mental incompetents, and trustees are held to higher standards of loyalty than are ordinary businessmen.
The equity jurisdiction of the chancellor's
court grew in the fifteenth century also to cure
problems in the administration of justice caused
by various defects in the procedures of the old
common-law courts. One common-law rule of
evidence was that a party could not testify in
court as a witness. Much has been written about
the aspect of this rule that a person cannot testify
against himself, but we will consider here that a
person also could not testify for himself. Thus,
where the only witnesses to a transaction or occurrence were the parties thereto, the person
injured could not prove his case in a court of
common law, because there was no admissible
evidence; and since the plaintiff always has the
burden of persuasion, the defendant would win
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by default. Thus, if one were assaulted in a dark
alley, one had no practical remedy at common
law. To aid the injured party, the courts of equity, where the defendant was required to plead
under oath, would allow a person with a common-law grievance to sue in equity in order to
force the defendant to respond under oath and
"discover" (make known) the truth, and then this
sworn statement would constitute a binding admission for use in the common-law court. In
time, the courts of equity, where discovery was
needed, began to retain the case and to decide
the common-law dispute in order to avoid the
multiplicity of litigation that would have been,
involved by sending the plaintiff back to the
court of law. This was the origin of the bill of
discovery.
One of the most glaring archaic features of the
medieval common law was trial by jury. Although
the criminal jury was usually up to its task, life
was too complicated for the civil jury; civil juries
were seldom sufficiently educated or experienced to understand complex issues of
financial importance. But regardless of how
good the jurors might have been, the jury system
required a single verdict of liability or not and,
if so, what damages. Thus, where there were
multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the commonlaw jury was inadequate to sort out issues of, for
example, which of the defendants might be liable
for what proportion of the damages. In the
courts of equity, which arose long after the common-law courts had settled upon the use of the
jury as the trier of the facts of the case, the judge
heard all of the issues of the case and, being an
educated and highly competent person, was able
to determine complicated issues.
Another jury-related problem was the common-law action of account. When the parties
presented an accounting dispute to the court,
the jury was required to render a separate verdict
on each line in the account; this clumsy procedure was beyond the abilities of a jury of ploughmen, and the courts of equity took over accounting litigation to remedy this deficiency in the
common law.
If two different persons claimed an object or
a fund in the hands of a third party, problems
could arise in the common-law courts. For example, if an expensive diamond necklace had been
given to a jeweler to be repaired, the owner had
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died, and the jeweler had then been sued at common law for the necklace by both the heir and the
widow, there would have been a very real danger
that the different juries in the two common-law
cases would both find against the jeweler. To
prevent the likelihood of inconsistent jury verdicts and double liability, the courts of equity
would allow the defendant jeweler to come into
equity and to bring both common-law plaintiffs
into the case, thus forcing them to litigate in
equity their competing common-law claims.
A more serious defect of the common-law
procedure was that when any party died, the lawsuit died, and the plaintiff had to restart his suit
from scratch. Where there were many parties, it
was frequently the case, particularly where a
whole family was involved, as in litigation over a
family inheritance, that parties would die and
new parties be born, so that the case could never
be brought to a conclusion. This problem was
remedied by the courts of equity, because there
a case could be easily revived when there was a
change in parties and the litigation would not be
frustrated by such accidents.
The fifteenth century in England was a period
of political weakness as a result of the drawn-out
Wars of the Roses; even during periods of peace,
the authority of the crown was weak. England
was at the mercy of private armies; the county
administrators, the sheriffs, were usually either
powerless or beyond the control of the courts. It
was a period during which the rich and the powerful of the county could manipulate or intimidate juries and thus pervert the course ofjustice.
Frequently weak and poor litigants had to resort
to the court of the lord chancellor, the most powerful political figure in the country, to obtain
justice against their strong neighb9rs. The chancellor was the king's prime minister in fact,
though not in name, and he could do justife and
enforce his orders without fear or favor .··l Many
common-law disputes were therefore heard in
the court of chancery in the fifteenth century.
Thus did equity come into existence to supplement and complement the common law. Equity does not comPete with the common law but
tunes it more finely. The common law is, in theory, a complete system; equity is not a system
within itself but rather relates to the common law
and aids the common law.Justice came to consist
of both common law and equity; English justice
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would be defective without both. This was recognized as early as the fifteenth century, and so
lawyers and judges had to work out in the pleading stage of the litigation whether justice in a
particular case was to be served in a court of
common law or a court of equity.
Equity does not deny the validity of the common law but rather recognizes it and fulfills it.
Equity does not change the common law, but
where a person is using the common law to an
unjust purpose, the equity judge will order that
person not to sue in the common-law court or
not toJ'enforce a common-law judgment. The
court of equity does not change the common law
or reverse, overrule, or annul any common-law
judgment, for to do so would be an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power and an illegal appellate power over the common-law
courts. But all disinterested persons would agree
that the common-law courts should not be used
in an unjust manner, and .thus, the equity court
orders that person not to do it. It is against good
conscience to do injustice. Equity courts simply
fOrce defendants to act according to conscience;
conseqyently, they have frequently been called
courts of conscience.
St. German was the first scholar to attempt to
explain the activities and jurisdiction of the chancellor's court. He spoke in terms of epikeia and
conscience. The former concept is that, although
all law must be framed in general terms, it should
be applied to individual cases with flexibility and
mitigation. 'fhe concept of conscience is the
same today as it was in the sixteenth century, a
sense of absolute right versus wrong. A party
should not be allowed to use the common law to
perpetrate a wrong. For example, if a person
made a written contract under seal, an agreement to pay money for an assignment of contract
rights, and then it turned out that the assignment
was invalid and worthless, the general commonlaw rules allowed the enforcement of the written
contract. However, the injustice of enforcing this
contract was obvious, because while contracts
should be kept as a general rule, where one party
did not get what he thought he was getting, he
should not have to give up what he promised to
pay. The remedy for the mistaken person is to
sue in equity for an order to the other party not
to sue on the contract and to return the written
agreement to him or, if he had already been
sued, not to ask the sheriff to execute the com-
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n1on-law judgment. Thus, the contract and the
common-law judgment remain in force, but if
they are taken advantage of, the obligee will be
put in prison for contempt of the equity court's
order.
Since the courts of equity grant remedies only
when the ordinary common-law remedies are
inadequate, the jurisdiction of the equity courts
is said to be extraordinary. The term extraordinary
is used here in the sense of going beyond the
basic rather than in the sense of unusual; equity
is both extraordinary and quite usual and frequent.
One aspect of extraordinary equity powers involves the personal order. A personal order does
not change the law or the parties' strict commonlaw rights and is enforced by the court's holding
the defendant in contempt and keeping him in
prison until he obeys. Thus, equity is said to act
in personam. A common-law court acts in rem
(that is, on the property of the defendant), declaring the money or land in dispute to belong to
the successful plaintiff. The common-law court
thus changes ownership and orders the sheriff to
take the money or land from the defendant and
to give it to the plaintiff. It should be noted,
however, that in modern pi:actice, statutes have
given the courts of equity power to act in rem so
that, for example, a sheriff can execute an equity
order or a commissioner can be appointed to
make a common-law conveyance or release in the
defendant's name.
The procedure of the equity courts, sometimes referred to as English bill procedure,
which was developed in the fifteenth-century
chancery, was clearly more modern and much
more efficient than the common-law procedure,
with its forms of action and trial by jury. Every
court that was set up by act of Parliament or
evolved on its own in England from the fifteenth
century onward used this English bill procedure
rather than the procedure of the common-law
courts.
It has been argued that the origin of equity
procedure and substantive law is to be found in
the procedure of the canon-law courts. Most of
the medieval English chancellors were bishops in
whose courts the canon law was used. It is my
opinion that equity was an evolution native to
England and that the bill grew out of an ordinary
petition or request, that depositions grew out of
administrative inquisitions, and so on. The fact
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that the chancellors were bishops does not mean
that they could not keep their courts entirely
separate. Indeed, many common-law judges
were bishops. Furthermore, many leading
medieval politicians were given bishoprics so
that the king could have administrators without
having to pay them salaries; the bishops could do
the king's work in person and their ecclesiastical
work by deputy. Most ecclesiastical courts were
presided over by the bishop's official or deputy
anyway. There are similarities and dissimilarities
between the canon law and equity.
The peaceful coexistence of law and equity
continued until the chancellorship of Cardinal
Wolsey during the early reign of Henry VIII.
Thomas Wolsey, a person of modest social background, came to the notice of Henry VIII, who
recognized in him a competent administrator
and so put him into the highest seats of power in

the kingdom, civic and ecclesiastical. As lord
chancellor, archbishop of York, cardinal, and
papal legate, he was exalted over all men in England except only the king himself and the pope.
The power went to Wolsey's head, and he alienated people. The odium that became attached to
Wolsey personally spilled over onto his court of
chancery and from there to the rules of equity
that were administered in chancery courts.
In 1529, Cardinal Wolsey, having failed to get
Henry VIII's divorce from Queen Catherine, was
stripped of all his offices and wealth. He died
shortly thereafter of a broken heart, having lost
his power, his only love. He was succeeded in the
office of lord chancellor by the common lawyer
Sir Thomas More. This was an interesting succession in that More was the first layman to be
appointed chancellor since 1454; he had not
been, and was not to become, the king's prime
political adviser; and he was a well-known practicing lawyer. It was believed that he would restore the proper relationship between common
law and equity. Soon after his appointment, he
called the judges together to settle this relationship. He proposed not to enjoin common-law
litigation if the judges would reform the common law, but the judges said that they did not
have the power to change the law, and this forced
More to continue to grant injunctions, in personam orders, as Wolsey and all earlier chancellors
had done. Thus, More's appointment did not
change or restore anything; but because he was
a courteous man, the antagonisms between com-
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mon law and equity were quickly forgotten, and
equanimity prevailed until the reign of James I.
In the first decade of the seventeenth century,
two very ambitious and aggressive men began to
compete over personal dominance of the English
legal system. The two were Thomas Egerton,
Lord Ellesmere, who became lord chancellor,
and Sir Edward Coke (pronounced "Cook"), a
common-law judge who became lord chief justice of England. The chancellor has always been
the administrative head on the English judiciary,
but tradition was for Coke a servant, not a master. When Coke became lord chief justice of England, he began a systematic attack on every
court and legal system but his own.
In the early seventeenth century, the concept
of res judicata-the doctrine that once a court
has decided a matter, it cannot be litigated again
-had not been worked out between the courts
of law and courts of equity. Therefore, if a person was sued at common law on a contract to
which he had a defense in equity, he could sue in
equity at once to stop the plaintiff (the obligee)
from suing at common law, or he could wait and,
if the common-law result was against him, sue to
prevent the enforcement of the judgment. Thus,
the defendant (the obligor) had two chances of
success. Today, the defendant at common law
must resort to equity at once or lose his equitable
defense.
This situation was galling to Coke because the
equity order, the injunction, appeared to be an
appeal to his rival, the lord chancellor. Coke
therefore let it be known that he was prepared to
stop this practice. Soon a most unworthy plaintiff, Richard Glanvill, appeared in Coke's court to
sue on a contract that was the result of his gross
fraud and deceit. (He had sold a topaz, representing it to be a diamond.) He got judgment;
the court of chancery issued an injunction to stop
enforcement of the common-law judgemel)t; the
injunction was disobeyed; Egerton put Glanvill
in prison for contempt of court; and Coke ordered him released on a writ of habeas corpus.
This matter ended inconclusively, but this case
and several others made a public issue of this
problem of the practice of law and the administration of justice. The whole matter of the
boundaries between common law and equity
were then referred to the king's counsel for full
debate and resolution. The result was in favor of
the courts of equity, as should have been ex-
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pected. Even though equity practice was not perfect, it was more modern and more flexible than
the common law. The old rule was thus reestablished in 1616 without any further serious dispute. Simply stated, the rule was that where the
results of an equity order and a common-law
order were in disagreement, the equity rule and
decree would prevail. Otherwise, equity would
have been unable to perform its function of seeing justice done in the individual case. Shortly
thereafter, Coke was removed from his judgeship and Egerton died, and things returned to
1
nri rmal in the English courts. A generation later,
personalities and politics, rather than jurisprudence, again impinged on the relationship between common law and equity. Soon after his
accession to the throne in 1625, Charles I decided to follow the French theories and methods
of government and to rule England without the
interference of Parliament. When Parliament
was removed as a political forum, the opponents
of the king's policies took their fights to the area
of the law courts. Lord Coventry, the lord chancellor, was identified with the king and his policie~. And again the dislike of the chancellor resulted in dislike of his court and of its
jurisprudence.
It was during this period that John Selden, the
famous legal scholar and antiroyalist, published
his famous jibe at equity: "Equity is a roguish
thing; for [in] law we have a measure [we can]
know what to trust to. Equity is according to the
conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that
is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as
if they should make the standard for the measure
we call a foot to be the chancellor's foot; what an
uncertain measure this Would be."
The political, military, and personal defeats of
Charles I are well known. As the king, the bishops, and the aristocracy were one by one
removed from power, the radicals turned against
Oliver Cromwell and the moderate Puritans, and
in their zeal and ignorance they attacked the law
itself. One of their proposals was to abolish the
court of chancery. This attack was the low point
of equity. This ill-conceived move was referred
to a commission set up under Sir Matthew Hale
to study the issue of law reform in general, and
nothing more was heard of the taking-away of
the chancery. During the interregnum, the court
of chancery was presided over by a committee of
three commissioners, and this assured that it
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would have no political power. The normal
course of equity jurisprudence in the courts of
chancery and exchequer continued unabated
during the time of Cromwell.
After the Restoration, the commercial empire
of England began to grow by leaps and bounds.
As English wealth became more and more based
on commerce, the patronage of the lord treasurer became greater than that of the lord chancellor, and so the politician closest to the king
sought to be appointed the former rather than
the latter. The result was that the chancellor became less important politically than he had been
in the past and thus had more time for the performance of his judicial duties. Furthermore, the
legal ability of the candidate for the position of
lord chancellor became more important than his
political connections. Thus, the period extending from the Restoration into the middle of the
nineteenth century produced a series of scholarly and legally adept chancellors whose opinions were systematically reported.
First and foremost was Heneage Finch, earl of
Nottingham, a lawyer arid a judge without equal.
Since the Middle Ages, the court of chancery had
been loosely called a court of conscience. Lord
Nottingham put the the~ry of conscience into its
proper perspective when, in Cook v. Fountain
(1676), he stated that he was not ruling according to the personal conscience of any particular
party litigant, himself, or the king but according
to the civic conscience of the English legal system. The concept of conscience as administered
in the courts of equity is general and institutional; it is to be found in the established practices and precedents of the courts of equity; it
applies equally to all persons. Since Nottingham
expounded equity doctrine in lucid and rational
opinions based on precedent and since his opinions were the first to be systematically published,
he has been called "the father of equity."
Equity jurisprudence was developed throughout the eighteenth century by a series of most
excellent jurists: Charles Talbot, Lord Talbot;
Philip Yorke, Lord Hardwicke; Charles Pratt,
Lord Camden; and Edward Thurlow, Lord
Thurlow, among others. The lord chancellor
during the long and difficult later years of
George III was John Scott, earl of Eldon. We
must pause to consider Lord Eldon as lord chancellor.
Lord Eldon, who was as politically and per-
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sonally traditional as the king, was a brilliant equity judge, but there were problems. Eldon was
pilloried by the novelist Charles Dickens in Bleak
House as being the perpetrator of endless judicial
delay, and the bar agreed with Dickens; Eldon
blamed the truly excessive delays in his court on
the bar and on the litigants themselves. (The
true villain in Bleak House was a testator who
made a series of wills without destroying the earlier ones.) However, frequently Eldon would
hear the evidence in a case, take it under advisement, and then two years later, when he was
ready to render an opinion, have to have the case
reargued. (If these delays were really so irksome
to the legal profession, they could have divide\!
their equity practice between the chancery and
the exchequer, but they for some reason preferred the delays of the chancery to quick results
in the exchequer.)
Lord Eldon's opinions were carefully reasoned and drafted; many are still cited today.
Eldon was judicially conservative, and he felt
bound to follow the traditional practices and the
established law. Thus, when justice required him
to grant a mandatory injunction in the case of
Lane v. Newdigate (1804), even though no such
order had ever been granted before, he felt
obliged to disguise it as a prohibitory injunction
by phrasing the orde.r as a double negative. Perhaps Eldon's judicial philosophy was caused by
Selden'sjibe of 150 years before. In Gee v. Pritchard (1818), Eldon said, "Nothing would inflict on
me greater pain ... than the recollection that I
had done anything to justify the reproach that
the equity of this court varies like the Chancellor's foot." And thus, by the conclusion of
Eldon's influential chancellorship, equity had
become as rigidly bound by precedent as was the
common law. And indeed ever since, equitable
remedies have been dispensed with the same understanding of precedent and stare decisis as
have common-law remedies. This will vary according to the judicial philosophy of a particular
judge or generation ofjudges; history shows that
the pendulum is always in motion.

EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES
By the time of the first English settlements in
America, equity was an integral part of English
law. The "Articles, Instructions and Orders"
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dated 20 November 1606 for the government of
Virginia required that litigation be determined
"as near to the common laws of England and the
equity thereof as may be." Once the Virginia
courts and an educated legal community was established, which happened sometime before the
mid-l 640s, equitable remedies were fully available. In Virginia, equity was administered by the
same courts that heard the common-law cases. In
some of the New England colonies, equity was
resisted. ,..fhe probable reason for this was the
identification of equity and arbitrary royal power
in the minds of nonlawyers. In eighteenth-century New York, an attempt was made to set up a
court of chancery to administer equity; thi.s was
strenuously opposed because the governor was
to be the sole chancellor and this was not politically desirable.
The substantive doctrines of equity can be administered in separate courts, as in England the
court of chancery had only equity jurisdiction
whereas the court of common pleas and the
court of king's bench had only common-law jurisdiction. In 1826 there were separate courts for
law and equity in Delaware, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Mississippi. Today there are separate courts in Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi,
and Tennessee.
An alternative is the system of fused courts, in
which common-law and equity cases are administered by the same court but common-law cases
are tried by common-law procedures and equity
cases by equity procedure. Here the courts are
said to have a common-law side and an equity
side. Although the same judge hears both types
of cases, a case must be brought as either one or
the other; the court sitting as a common-law
court cannot grant an equitable remedy, but if
the case is transferred to the court's equity side,
it can. The courts of Virginia from 1607 ro the
present, except for the period 1776-1831', have
been thus fused. In 1826 the lower courts of New
York, Maryland, Virginia, Missouri, North Carolina, and Kentucky were examples of this type of
judicial organization, as were the federal courts
before 1938. Today this system of justice exists
in Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia.
In the 1820s many equitable doctrines were
being administered in the common-law courts of
Pennsylvania, and a limited amount of equity had
slipped into the common-law practice in New

'
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England. It was ag-ainst this background thatjoseph Story of Massachusetts published his encyclopedic treatises on equity practice and equity
jurisprudence. In the southern states, equity was
freely available. (It is to be recalled that the first
reports published in Virginia were a selection of
equity opinions of George Wythe, which were
collected for publication in 1795, and the second
volume of Conway Robinson's The Practice in the
Courts of Law and Equity in Virginia was published
in 1835.) On the other hand, in the northern
states, a general undercurrent of skepticism of
equity remained.
In the 1840s a movement for law reform
through codification was initiated in New York
by David Dudley Field. His most notable achievement involved civil procedure, including the abolition of the common-law forms of action and
the merger of the procedures of common law
and equity. The most remarkable aspect of the
New York "Field Code" of 1848 was that the
substantive doctrines and remedies of common
law and equity could be freely combined in the
same lawsuit; this was the first procedural system
in Anglo-American jurisprudence to provide a
merged system of law and equity. The substantive rules were not altered, but the old procedures of judicial administration were merged
into one. It is to be noted that Field's new statutory procedure was a modernized and streamlined one based on equity procedure; the common-law procedures, with the exception of trial
by jury, were discarded. The success of the
merger oflaw and equity procedure in New York
was followed by its successful adoption in most
states, in England (in 1873), and in federal practice (in 1938).
Equity procedures and practices, then, have
come to dominate American civil procedure
through the influence of Field. In particular,
masters and receivers and the equity devices of
pleading by petition and answer, discovery, interpleader, class actions, third-party practice, injunctions, and contempt-of-court proceedings
have all taken their place in all courts in the
United States.
Masters (also known as commissioners) in
chancery are officers of the court appointed on
an ad hoc basis to aid the equity judge in performing some routine but time-consuming task.
The most frequent use of masters is to take complicated accountings and to conduct judicial
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sales of property. But a master can also be appointed to hear evidence on some part of the
case or to draft and execute a conveyance or
other document.
Receivers are officers of the court who are
appointed to take possession of property that is
the subject of litigation. Such a seizure of property may be necessary to prevent its being hidden, destroyed, or lost during the course of the
judicial proceedings. The receiver, at the direction of the judge, takes possession of the property and holds it safely until further order of the
court. A receiver may be appointed simply to
hold an object or a fund, or he may even run a
corporation to preserve it as a going concern,
pending its sale or reorganization. Receivers are
appointed to sell off the assets of a bankrupt
business.
Equity has also had a deep and lasting impact
on the content of American law, as well as on its
procedure. In the area of contracts law, the equitable remedy of specific performance is vital. In
some cases the ancient common-law remedy of
money damages as.compensation for the wrongful breach of a contract is not adequate to satisfy
a person; where it is not, a court will exercise its
equity powers and ·force the defaulting party to
do what he contracted to do. Thus, where there
is a contract to sell a unique object, the seller will
not be allowed to back out and pay damages for
his breach, but he will be compelled specifically
to deliver the item sold. Note that the equitable
remedy is granted only where the common-law
remedy will not do complete justice; the ancient
relationships survive in a merged system of administration.
Contracts for the sale of agricultural land will
be thus "specifically enforced," as the expression goes. No farm is like any other one, and
thus, the disappointed buyer cannot go and buy
another farm to replace his lost bargain, as can
the purchaser of a ton of gravel. In agricultural
England, the specific enforcement of land sales
contracts became so much the normal remedy
that all land is now considered unique as a matter
of law and the remedy of specific performance is
always available, no matter how indistinguishable one unit of a condominium may be from
another.
As to suits to enforce contracts, there are
many defenses that are of equitable origin, such
as dishonest conduct that does not involve a di-
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rect lie or dilatory conduct that harms another.
An unforeseeable accident or a catastrophe of
nature may relieve a person from a contractual
obligation. A grossly unfair and harsh bargain
that "shocks the conscience" will be set aside by
principles of equity, even though the commonlaw rules of making the contract were followed.
Equity has also created a means for assuring
the adequate supervision of the actions of fiduciaries. 'T'hus, the executor of a will may ask an
equity judge to interpret the will, and the administrator of a dead person's estate may ask him for
advice and guidance as to the accounting for,
and distribution of, the assets. Directors and
officers of corporations have fiduciary duties to
their corporations, and therefore, most of the
problems of corporations and corporation law
are solved by equitable principles. Trustees and
guardians are also fiduciaries and are supervised
by the equity courts.
The courts of equity also have the power to
issue orders to forbid the commission of future
torts where the threatened wrongful act is likely
to occur in the near future and common-law
damages will not afford adequate compensation.
This is known as the court's quia timet jurisdiction; the suit is brought by a person "because he
fears" that a tort will be committed against him.
For example, if your -rext door neighbor threatens to cut down an ornamental tree that is on
your land or to throw poisoned meat onto your
land so that your dog will eat it, you can get an
injunction to forbid such acts. Usually the likelihood of imprisonment for contempt of the injunction is a sufficient deterrent to the threatened tort.
Thus, equity has become an integral part of
American law. The major misconception about
equity-that it is administered at the whim or
caprice of the judge-is not, and never has been,
true. The "discretion" exercised by the equity
judge is a sound judicial discretion regulated by
the established principles of equity that have,

over time, come to play an invaluable role 1n
American legal practice.
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